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Globalisation is in crisis. The German Presidency of the G20 in 2017 faces 
an unprecedented challenge. The G20 cannot save globalisation on its own, 
but it can play a vital role in finding and facilitating the necessary solutions. 
This GIGA Focus analyses why the G20 is well-suited to taking on this task, 
how it might do so, and the pitfalls it must avoid.
 • Globalisation is worth saving, but it needs to be reformed. The G20 might be 
the ideal forum to achieve this. Its strengths lie in its origins as a crisis man-
agement group, its flexible structure, and the critical mass of countries that it 
brings together along with its outreach processes.
 • A G20 negotiation to rescue globalisation could take three shapes: a) Multi-
lateralism is revitalised and globalisation duly reformed b) multilateralism is 
diminished and we get a lower-scale but renegotiated globalisation c) multilat-
eralism ends and de-globalisation ensues.
 • The G20 needs high-level individual and collective political commitment com-
bined with sound issue-specific technical measures to renegotiate the bargain 
on globalisation. It also needs to address its legitimacy deficit while retaining 
its efficiency and flexibilty.
 • The German presidency offers a unique opportunity to make the most of the G20 
process and help solve the current crisis.
Policy Implications
For the G20 to successfully address the crisis of globalisation, three measures are 
important: a) Visionary leadership from the highest political levels b) issue-spe-
cific and research-backed technical solutions c) attention to enhancing the legiti-
macy of the group through existing outreach processes and greater inclusiveness 
towards non-members.
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G20 and Globalisation
Globalisation is in crisis – witness the anti-free trade rhetoric and policies of Presi-
dent Trump, the referendum in favour of Brexit, and the rise of Right-wing populist 
movements across different countries. The German Presidency of the G20 in 2017 
faces an unprecedented challenge. While the G20 – on its own – cannot rescue glo-
balisation, it can play a critical role in finding the necessary solutions. In this paper, 
I explain why the G20 may be particularly well-equipped to do so, how it might go 
about it, and the pitfalls that it must avoid if it is to successfully fulfil its potential.
This GIGA Focus proceeds in five sections. It offers a brief analysis of the prob-
lems that globalisation is confronted with today, and presents the case in favour 
of saving it (albeit in a reformed version). It then explains why the G20 might be 
one of the few institutions still capable of doing so, despite its limitations and also 
the critiques that have been directed against it. In the third step, I explore three 
scenarios – ranging from the most optimal in terms of global welfare and the least – 
which are related in good measure on the position that the US adopts, and the strat-
egies that Germany and other G20 members use. The fourth section highlights the 
risks in this process. The fifth and final section explains why the fact that we have 
a German Presidency of the G20 might turn out to be particularly important in the 
current context.
1. The Case for Saving Globalisation
Globalisation – the increasing integration among countries and peoples via the 
movement of goods, services, capital, labour, images and ideas across borders – 
faces a widespread backlash of unprecedented ferocity today. Britain’s decision to 
leave the European Union (EU), and US President Donald Trump’s sustained anti-
free trade rhetoric, are both striking examples of this backlash. The recurrence of 
deadlocks in multilateral trade negotiations is another example, as is the case of 
the Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) that has been declared dead by the 
US and European members even before it was born. Just as serious is the grow-
ing popularity of Right-wing nationalist movements across Europe. In developed 
and developing countries, pundits and activists point to rising income inequalities, 
and argue that globalisation is failing the world’s poorest and weakest people. Is 
globalisation really worth saving, in spite of these accusations? The answer is an 
emphatic yes.
The economic data is unambiguously clear: globalisation has generated growth 
and prosperity for all countries at an aggregate level. Several processes that consti-
tute globalisation help increase the size of the collective economic pie at a global 
level and also among the countries that participate in these processes. But within 
countries the picture is much more mixed. Many competitive sectors and  consumers 
gain from globalisation, while specific groups often lose out. The losses can be es-
pecially costly and pernicious if there are no mitigating national policies in place, 
which ensure a transfer of a share of the winnings of globalisation to those  hardest 
hit by it. It is the discontent of these groups that fuels the anti-globalisation move-
ment today, and generates the adverse consequences highlighted in the above 
paragraph. If anti-globalisation does indeed result in de-globalisation – and de-
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globalisation is far from an impossibility [1] – the costs will be high for the system 
as a whole. The global economic pie and also the national economic pies will de-
crease, leaving all countries worse off. And while everyone would be worse off by 
de-globalisation, the costs will be significantly higher for the poor than for the rich.
If de-globalisation is to be avoided, a new multilateral bargain needs to be 
struck on a reformed globalisation. Such a bargain must do all of the following:
a) Facilitate a fundamental rethinking of the goals of international cooperation, 
particularly which global public goods key powers are willing to provide;
b) include the marginalised many (i.e. countries that have lacked agenda-setting 
power in shaping globalisation thus far, and also excluded groups in developed 
and developing countries) in this process of rethinking, rather than be restricted 
to the global elite of powerful countries;
c)  ensure that any new international rules have sufficient policy space within them 
to both allow and encourage countries to take on the necessary domestic meas-
ures that distribute the gains of globalisation more evenly, as determined by the 
state-specific social contracts;
d) be backed by a knowledge-based consensus that is clearly communicated to 
various stakeholders, and one that offers solid facts and arguments to balance 
against the often ill-informed but consistently passionate intensity of the anti-
globalisers.
This is a tall order, and one that formal international organisations have failed to 
deliver by large margin. The abysmal progress of the Doha negotiations in the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) is one case in point. Certainty of deadlock has paralysed 
the United Nations Security Council on critical issues such as conflict in the Middle 
East, leading players of different sizes and types to resort to ruthless power politics 
in the region. Even the EU – much more of a restricted membership club, and thus 
less divided by culture and norms than multilateral forums – has had very limited 
successes in securing more equitable burden-sharing on immigration. A constant 
state of deadlock and crisis not only undermines the credibility of these institutions 
themselves, but also threatens the post-war order of prosperity and stability that 
they were created to preserve. The machinery of global governance seems badly 
stalled. A turn to bilateralism and unilateralism provides no substitute because the 
global problems that we face today require coordinated global solutions. Could the 
G20 help?
2. The Potential of the G20
The G20 might be the ideal forum to take on these difficult tasks, which are neces-
sary steps to renegotiating the globalisation bargain. This is so for three reasons.
First, one of the strengths of the G20 lies in its origins. The group – at the  leaders’ 
level – was created specifically to coordinate a response among the major econo-
mies on the financial crisis of 2008, which had originated in the US but was having 
rapid spillover effects worldwide. [2] The need of the day then was an “agile instru-
ment” that could deal with “emergency economic problems” (Mantega 2008). The 
G20 proved itself adept in handling the immediate effects of the crisis. It provided a 
forum for the major economies to avoid the beggar-thy-neighbour policies that had 
greatly exacerbated the Great Depression in the 1930s. Instead, the G20 facilitated 
1 Contrary to popular be-
lief, there is nothing inevi-
table or teleological about 
globalisation. It is true that 
one of the drivers of glo-
balisation – technological 
innovation – will likely retain 
its momentum; this aspect 
of globalisation is thus 
more resilient. But a great 
many areas of globalisa-
tion are driven by policy 
decisions and choices. 
In these cases, the threat 
of de-globalisation is very 
real. For example, govern-
ments can still put up 
trade barriers and thereby 
severely restrict the flow of 
goods and services; they 
can tighten border controls 
to curtail the movement 
of labour; and they can 
put regulations in place 
to control investment to 
reduce capital flows. The 
resulting dramatic reduc-
tion in the flow of goods, 
services, labour and capital 
would be an example of 
de-globalisation.
2 Note that the roots 
of the leaders’ level G20 
go back to 1999, when 
the G7 forum of finance 
ministers and central bank 
governers was expanded 
to the G20 in the aftermath 
of the Asian Financial Crisis 
of 1998.
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a coordinated response on fiscal stimulus, and helped improve financial regulation. 
While its subsequent efforts to expand into a “Steering Committee” for the global 
economy led to multiple criticisms along different lines (which appealed to different 
normative principles of legitimacy and efficiency) (e.g. Sidiropoulos 2011; Harris 
Rimmer 2015), its primary and original role as a “Crisis Committee” was much less 
contested (Cooper 2010). Today, given its original and successful record as a rapid-
response, crisis-management group, the G20 may be particularly well-suited to ad-
dress the crisis of anti-globalisation/de-globalisation that the world faces today.
The second comparative advantage of the G20 lies in its structure. Always in-
tended as a flexible, rapid and improvised reaction force, it still does not have a per-
manent secretariat. Its mandate is relatively less regimented than the mandates of 
formal organisations. The particular country that takes over the Presidency, work-
ing in cooperation particularly with the preceding Presidency and the succeeding 
one (the “troika”), can take the initiative to set the agenda and address the most 
pressing problems of the time. The face-to-face contact among the leaders, amidst 
this relatively flexible institutional backdrop and relatively small numbers, [3] can 
be key to trust-building and the exercise of collective leadership. This  leader-level 
diplomacy (backed by the “sherpas” of each country) is accompanied by  issue-based 
processes from different ministries. Depending on the specific issues that the 
particular Presidency wishes to address, these can include meetings of Finance 
 Ministers, Foreign Ministers, Trade Ministers, Agriculture Ministers and so forth. 
The combination of leader-level summitry and issue-specific meetings is important 
because it can help achieve the right mix of visionary leadership and technical im-
plementation.
Third, a necessary condition for successfully saving globalisation by renego-
tiating it is to have a critical mass of economies on board, even though it is not a 
sufficient condition. The G20, despite its relatively small number of members, pro-
vides this critical mass: together, its members constitute over 80 per cent of world 
trade and two-thirds of the world’s population. This is a good starting point from an 
efficiency perspective. Importantly, however, partly in response to some  scathing 
 criticisms about its legitimacy (e.g. Aslund 2009), the G20 has also improved its 
“outreach processes” over the years. Via processes such as T20 (Think 20), C20 
(Civil Society 20), B20 (Business 20) and so forth, the G20 has the possibility to 
gain valuable inputs from non-state actors. While there still remain issues of legiti-
macy, which I address in Section 4, suffice it to note here that the G20’s networked 
diplomacy potentially offers more voice to non-state actors – that is to a large pro-
portion of those same stakeholders who have expressed their extreme disillusion-
ment with globalisation – than most other formal international organisations. If 
it were to use these networks effectively, it could help build a new and sustainable 
global bargain.
3. Renegotiating Globalisation in the G20
As a relatively lean group that is structurally constituted to combat crisis, and one 
that brings together critical mass as well as outreach, the G20 may be our best hope. 
But the crisis that the G20 was created to manage – the 2008 financial crisis – dif-
fers from the crisis that globalisation faces today in two ways. First, in 2008, the US 
3 The G20 membership 
comprises 19 states, plus 
the EU, in contrast to 164 
members in the WTO and 
193 in the United Nations.
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had played a major role in triggering the financial crisis, but it also wanted to be a 
part of the solution. Deep interconnectedness and the risk of contagion made other 
powers also willing to share the burden of crisis resolution and stabilisation. Today, 
however, the US is much less engaged; other powers, while willing to still share 
some burdens, have not shown themselves to be capable or willing to fill the hege-
monic vacuum that seems to be emerging. Second, in 2008, one of the reasons why 
the G20 was able to catalyse sustained crisis management strategies (in contrast to 
the 1930s) was because of the existence of supportive international organisations 
(such as the International Monetary Fund, the WTO, and the Financial Stability 
Forum that became the Financial Stability Board in 2009). In 2017, these interna-
tional institutions have become greatly weakened as, for example, is the case with 
the WTO whose credibility has been severely dented by its recurrent deadlocks. This 
altered context makes the G20’s tasks much harder to fulfil. A G20 negotiation to 
rescue globalisation could thus take the following three shapes, with the first being 
the most conducive to stability and prosperity, and the last the least so.
3.1 Multilateralism Revitalised, Globalisation Reformed
To achieve the first scenario, a necessary condition will be a renewed commitment 
of the US to the globalisation agenda and the institutions of global governance that 
underpin it. Other players in the G20, particularly European member-states, the 
EU, and the rising powers, could play a constructive role in influencing this out-
come, in four immediate ways. 
First, all the other players – but especially the European states and the ris-
ing powers – could reassure the US by agreeing to greater burden-sharing (akin to 
the strategies that some European countries are now employing with reference to 
NATO). Second, these same players – but especially the rising powers whose trade 
policies have been relatively more protectionist – could offer greater market open-
ing via the reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers. This was part of the Doha 
agenda – a wide-ranging trade round that was not restricted to addressing develop-
ment concerns but also included some gains for the developed  countries – but the 
WTO failed to deliver. These two steps – of burden-sharing and market opening – 
would be important in challenging the argument that appeared so forcefully in the 
US elections last year, but has also been simmering away in many other countries, 
that globalisation has somehow shortchanged some countries and unfairly bene-
fited others. Third, the globalisation discourse would also need very significant re-
working. For instance, it would be very important to demonstrate that a globalised 
economy is not at odds with an “America First” policy; rather, globalisation pro-
duces win-win situations, whereas de-globalisation is a certain recipe for reducing 
national welfare. The G20 could play an important part in shaping this discourse, 
particularly with the assistance of solid facts grounded in scholarship. In this con-
text, the T20, which brings in expertise from research institutes and think tanks, 
could prove to be a valuable resource that G20 leaders could draw on. 
Finally, all member states of the G20 must carefully consider the national poli-
cies they want to put in place to ensure that the gains of globalisation are shared 
within their societies. These policies depend on the political cultures of individual 
countries, and thus cannot be directly regulated by the G20. But working with the 
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C20, that ensures the participation of civil society, the G20 can have a useful impact 
in norm creation on the broader issue of equitable growth and development, even 
as member states work out internally the specific strategies to achieve these goals.
Together, these four steps could help bring disenchanted players – including 
the US – back to the negotiating table, breathe new life into the faltering institu-
tions of global governance, and pioneer a reformed globalisation whose gains are 
better shared across and within countries.
3.2 Multilateralism Diminished, Globalisation Renegotiated
If the US fails to re-engage, despite the incentives offered under scenario 1, the in-
ternational system of rules could still be preserved and globalisation could still be 
renegotiated. This is because the US, while still the largest economy in the world, 
is no longer in a position of the overwhelming predominance that it enjoyed in the 
post-World War II era. But there is no getting around the fact that any bargains 
struck with the US on the margins would be, at best, a “diminished multilateralism” 
(Rüland 2012), which would generate a reduced economic pie to be shared among 
the involved parties. The resulting bargain would not fully revitalise globalisation, 
but it would allow globalisation to still be constructively renegotiated.
All the four steps outlined under scenario 1 would be just as relevant for scen-
ario 2. Additionally, however, a more concerted effort would be necessary from the 
remaining members of the G20 to signal their united commitment to the renegoti-
ated bargain on globalisation. Supporting institutions would need to be reinforced 
and buttressed, for example by strengthening the EU (all the more so in the face 
of Brexit) and by G20 countries returning to the negotiating table at the WTO and 
finding new ways to break its deadlocks. Individual countries would have to show 
leadership, much along the lines that the Chinese president displayed at the World 
Economic Forum; leadership, moreoever, requires not only talking the talk of eco-
nomic integration but also walking the walk. It is difficult to see how far Scenario 2 
could be sustained without at least some consensus on shared values – and this con-
sensus would need to be more deep-rooted among relatively equal partners (than 
in a hegemonic system that is maintained through a mix of factors ranging from 
coercion to persuasion, and large allowances for free-riding). Such a consensus will 
not be easy to forge amidst the diversified membership of the G20, which includes 
players who have challenged the Western liberal order on normative, geopolitical 
and economic terms. But here also, were the G20 to use its underlying structural 
logic to rewrite the globalisation bargain – drawing on the different visions of order 
that members bring – new red lines would emerge but so would new negotiation 
space (Narlikar 2016; Narlikar and Plagemann 2016).
 3.3 Multilateralism Ended, De-Globalisation Follows
This third scenario is the most likely result of inaction. It is also a likely result if the 
G20 fails to counter the small but real risk that several of its other members emu-
late the UK and the US, and give in to short-term populist measures of pulling out 
of trade deals and other long-standing agreements that promote economic integra-
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tion. This outcome would be sub-optimal for the individual countries themselves, 
and would almost certainly have an adverse effect on jobs, productivity, and con-
sumer welfare (i.e. all the problems that such populist measures claim to address 
would, in fact, be exacerbated). And if a critical mass of G20 countries engages in 
such behaviour, these negative effects would multiply considerably via retaliatory 
beggar-thy-neighbour policies. A further casualty would be the severe denting of 
the already fragile credibility of international organisations. A downward spiral of 
de-globalisation would ensue. The resulting losses would be high for the system as 
a whole, but they would be especially high for its poorest people (in both developed 
and developing countries).
4. Pitfalls to Avoid
If the G20 is to successfully renegotiate globalisation, three potential pitfalls must 
be avoided.
First, the G20’s negotiated outcomes take the shape of public declarations of its 
leader-level summitry on the one hand, and detailed reform proposals of support-
ing technocrats on the other. The temptation to focus mainly on technical aspects 
of solutions can be especially high when one is faced with a populist resurgence 
because meticulous detail can help ground impassioned debates in well-researched 
facts. But even the most carefully constructed, technocratic, issue-specific solutions 
will fail to address the crisis of globalisation if visionary political leadership is not 
forthcoming. The effectiveness of this level was most clearly demonstrated in the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, when the commitment to keep markets open 
and inject much-needed stimulus into them could not have been taken on by even 
the most skilled technocrats (such as Central Bank officials) on their own. Leader-
level involvement can – and indeed did in the early years of the G20 – insert a 
certain va va voom into otherwise esoteric economic negotiations, and help build 
public interest and stakes in their success. The commitment of the leaders’ level was 
also crucial in the implementation stage in three ways: ensuring a balance of gains 
and adjustment pain within their national economies (something that could not be 
achieved within issue-specific silos); selling these policies to their populations; and 
building trust among countries to reduce the risk of defection from agreements for 
short-term individual gain that would have resulted in collective losses. This is pre-
cisely what makes the leaders’ level G20 so important, and presents us with a great 
opportunity. Every effort should be made to harness this opportunity in Hamburg 
to ensure that heads of state clearly signal – and concretely engage – with the task 
of sustaining an updated and reformed globalisation.
That said, the second pitfall to avoid for the G20 is to allow a weakening of its 
technocratic base. Carefully conceptualised detail must underpin any measures that 
the leaders recommend. Without this commitment to detail, and associated opera-
tionalisation, even the flashiest summits risk relegation to becoming little more than 
photo opportunities and what game theorists refer to as “cheap talk.” The G20 has 
a record of quite successfully combining leader-level diplomacy with issue-specific 
mandarin diplomacy in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. The 
institution, which brings together high-level summitry (of heads of states but also 
individual summits of specific ministries) with the sherpa process and also various 
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outreach processes, is structurally conducive to facilitating this. But as with most 
international institutions, the G20 needs to avoid the risk of “mission creep” and 
instead stick to a small set of critical issues that are key to preserving the benefits of 
globalisation and mitigating its adverse effects. Exercising some self-discipline and 
restraint in mandate expansion is important because it prevents institutions from 
being saddled with unfair expectations, and also allows them to be held to account. 
Addressing the crisis of globalisation provides the G20 with a valuable opportunity 
to return to the fundamentals.
Very importantly, these technical details must be clearly communicated to all 
stakeholders. Such communication needs to be backed by explanations as to why 
recommended reform measures are necessary, what benefits they bring to the dif-
ferent constituencies, and how associated costs will be dealt with. Recurrent fail-
ures to do this in the past – across international institutions – have contributed sig-
nificantly to the anti-elite and anti-expert sentiment that accompanies most  populist 
drives (including the Brexit) and to the turn away from liberal institutionalism. 
Third, and related to the above point: not even the most efficacious balance of 
visionary leadership and careful attention to technical detail will save globalisation 
if the G20 lacks legitimacy. This is one of the most serious accusations that has been 
repeatedly levelled against the institution, especially as its mandate has expanded 
beyond the crisis management strategies of the early years. This is why both political 
proclamations and technical proposals must be clearly communicated to all stake-
holders. The outreach process contributes towards improving both the input and 
output legitimacy of the G20 as far as stakeholders within member countries are 
concerned. But this is not enough. The G20 – even if it were to come up with the 
best ideas, in consultation with all its outreach groups – must find a way of includ-
ing the many countries that are not members. This does not mean direct represen-
tation for all countries (which, in fact, would drastically undermine the efficiency 
of the group). Rather, it requires retaining the relatively small member character 
of the institution, but also ensuring a consultation and feedback process with non-
members. The G20 already does this partly by inviting representatives of regional 
groupings like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the African 
Union to its meetings. Heads of international organisations such as the WTO, the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB), and the International Labour Organization (ILO) are also invited to some 
of the consultations in advance of the summit. But more could be done to improve 
the inclusiveness of the group without undermining its efficiency. For example, 
 member countries could take it upon themselves to work in coalitions, and thereby 
bring in the views of non-member allies to the High Table. There may perhaps even 
be some merit in the G20’s reconceptualisation of itself from a self-proclaimed self-
appointed “premier forum” (Leaders’ Statement 2009) for international economic 
cooperation to something more modest but also more effective and inclusive that 
serves as a “hub” of global economic governance. Such a hub model – via processes 
of internal and external consultations and networks – could bestow far greater legi-
timacy and sustainability to its proposals than is currently enjoyed by any other 
international institution.
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5. Why a German Presidency Could Make a Difference
A German Presidency of the G20 should offer us considerable hope, especially given 
the severity of the crisis that globalisation faces today. 
First, Germany is not only a major economy, but it has a well-deserved reputa-
tion of being an effective and reliable negotiator (as illustrated, for instance, in the 
role that it played in the Iran negotiations).
Second, the theme of this Presidency, “Shaping an Interconnected World”, 
 offers much potential for the needs of the day, especially if one places emphasis on 
“shaping.” The subjects covered are illustrated in the following table, and offer an 
interesting balance between order and stability on the one hand, and reform and 
change on the other. Germany, moreover, has been a de facto pioneer of an agenda 
of well-regulated globalisation; witness, for instance, its strong welfare state, its 
commitment to sustainable growth and development, and its relatively strong regu-
lations on internet governance. A reformed globalisation will need to include at 
least some such elements, which allow us to preserve the international peace and 
prosperity that comes with open markets but also to curb the domestic discontent 
and inequality that unregulated open markets can exacerbate. The German economy 
may offer the G20 some useful generalisable ideas.
Building Resilience Improving Sustainability Assuming Responsibility
World Economy Climate and Energy
Tackling the Causes of 
Displacement
Global Trade The 2030 Agenda Partnership with Africa
Employment Digitalisation Fighting Terrorism
Financial Markets/International  
Financial Architecture
Health Anti-Corruption
Tax Cooperation Empowering Women Agriculture/Food Security
Third, Germany is also the country where discourse flourishes, and where delibera-
tive democracy is taken very seriously. These are valuable assets to have at hand, 
when one is trying to improve the legitimacy and inclusiveness of an institution like 
the G20, without destroying its efficiency.
Finally, if the G20 is to save globalisation, it needs to combine self-assuredness 
with self-critique on how leaders and experts have collectively managed economic 
integration over the past many decades. [4] The material and normative worth of 
globalisation needs to be properly recognised and acknowledged, but several of its 
processes also need to be improved. Germany seems to bring this mix of approaches 
very patently into international negotiations, and much more so than the trium-
phalism that one sees with some other established and rising powers. This G20 
process could go a long way in setting the right agenda across member countries 
and international organisations, were it to adopt a similar mix of self-assuredness 
and self-critique as it takes on this challenging task.
Table 1.  
Topics of the G20 
Summit, 2017
Source: The Federal 
Government (2016).
4 State Secretary Markus 
Ederer highlighted the 
importance of both values 
in approaching global 
problems; Munich Security 
Conference, Agenda-Set-
ting Kick-off meeting, 13 
February 2017.
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